Pagina dettaglio corso numero uno

by Oriana Binik, Professor of Criminology at the University of Milano-Bicocca

Bill No. 1517, Introduction of the Role of Forensic Psychologist and Additional Measures to Combat Violence Against Women, was submitted by Senator Renato Ancorotti (Fratelli d’Italia) on August 5 and is currently under discussion.

The bill aims to “strengthen, in a structural and effective manner, the prevention and counteraction of crimes related to violence against women.” It therefore positions itself within the critically important domain of prevention, proposing intervention strategies that appear to align with the expectations of professionals and practitioners who have long been engaged in this field. The proposal promises “structural” and “effective” action.

According to international guidelines and scientific evidence, effective and structural prevention measures are grounded in a socio-ecological model that seeks to enhance individual, relational, and community resources, while maintaining sustained attention to social inequalities and the cultural contexts in which such violence arises.

At first glance, the bill appears to align with this approach by stating that “not all deviant behaviors can be identified as pathology.” This initial framing suggests an intention to locate male violence against women within its socio-ecological foundations, thus distancing itself from simplistic, individual-pathology-based explanations that tend to exonerate perpetrators. The bill further asserts its intent to “protect the victim through preventive interventions targeting the perpetrator,” highlighting the importance of strengthening prevention efforts specifically directed at men. However, rather than focusing on primary prevention (e.g., initiatives aimed at the general male population, such as school-based programs), it instead creates space for secondary and tertiary prevention interventions—targeting men “at risk” or those who have already exhibited violent behavior.

Over recent years, treatment programs for men who perpetrate violence have been increasingly adopted, thanks in part to the development of specialized service networks (e.g., C.U.A.V.—Centers for Treatment of Perpetrators of Domestic Violence). These centers aim to prevent recidivism by fostering reflexivity, emotional regulation, and accountability for violent actions. In line with recent recommendations (GREVIO, 2022), these centers operate within a socio-ecological framework and involve multidisciplinary teams to ensure that perpetrators can understand their violent behavior as emerging from a complex interplay of social, cultural, relational, emotional, and identity-related factors.

The programs offered by these services are complex and demanding, requiring motivation, commitment, and often participation in group activities. According to ISTAT (2023), some centers choose not to take on clients who do not demonstrate adequate motivation (reported as the reason for rejection in 59% of cases) or who persist in denying their violent behavior (51%). CUAVs primarily work with convicted individuals referred by judicial authorities (tertiary prevention), while voluntary access remains limited. They also operate within the realm of secondary prevention, accepting referrals from services or institutions that have identified specific individuals as needing support to prevent the onset of violent behavior, and that have engaged in preliminary efforts to foster a desire for change in those individuals.

One of the most contested and complex issues in the work of CUAVs concerns motivation for change. Practitioners and researchers continue to debate how best to cultivate this motivation effectively, particularly in light of the instrumental nature of participation by individuals seeking conditional release following the implementation of the “Codice Rosso” (Red Code) law.

Within this context, the intervention logic proposed by the bill appears to starkly diverge from its own stated premises and from the gradual, evidence-based progress made in recent years—for several reasons.

First and foremost, the bill targets reported individuals, not convicted ones. From the perspective of CUAVs’ methodologies, the absence of a conviction complicates efforts to promote accountability and to dismantle denial mechanisms. Thus, any interventions would need to follow the logic of secondary prevention, targeting those considered “at risk.” However, such operational nuances seem almost irrelevant, as the bill does not appear to engage meaningfully with the co-constructed, evidence-informed psycho-socio-educational interventions developed over time, nor does it seek continuity with established best practices.

Perhaps the most problematic element of the bill lies in its provision for mandatory treatment, even in the absence of a conviction, and its explicitly medicalized approach. It states that “in cases of a substantiated risk of repeated criminal behavior that poses a serious and current threat to the life or physical or psychological integrity of the victim, the public prosecutor, or law enforcement officers with authorization from the public prosecutor, may subject the reported individual to a temporary and compulsory medical assessment.” Where deemed necessary, the individual may be subjected to mandatory psychotherapeutic treatment at public healthcare facilities, CUAVs, private affiliated clinics, or even hospitalized in public or affiliated institutions.

The evaluation of the individual—currently conducted by multidisciplinary teams using validated international protocols—would be anticipated and assigned to a single mental health professional (a forensic psychologist or psychiatrist), who would intervene during the early phases of judicial proceedings and assess the reported individual’s need for mandatory treatment. In essence, the expert would be tasked with evaluating social dangerousness prior to any conviction, thereby evoking troubling historical alliances between medicine and the justice system.

Viewed from this perspective, the bill unmistakably echoes the logic of author-based criminal law (Diritto Penale d’Autore): while the desire for timely intervention is understandable, it risks transforming into a mechanism for neutralizing suspects—not for what they have done, but for who they are, potentially through involuntary hospitalization. Furthermore, the bill pathologizes the alleged perpetrator, framing violent behavior as the exclusive result of individual psychological dysfunctions to be urgently “corrected,” thus converting psychotherapy into a kind of precautionary measure at the disposal of the prosecutor.

From a practical standpoint, this raises the critical question of motivation for change—closely tied to the broader issue of treatment efficacy. To what extent can coercing a reported individual into treatment give rise to a transformative process worth fostering? Data on CUAVs’ rejection of clients due to lack of motivation suggests a clear answer. Moreover, the scientific literature on mandatory treatment in this context is extremely limited, and such interventions are absent from international guidelines, which continue to emphasize the need to invest in primary prevention through broad, holistic approaches.

To this already problematic picture, Article 7 of the bill adds another controversial element: the creation of a public registry of individuals convicted of crimes falling under the so-called “Red Code” (including homicide, domestic abuse, sexual violence—including group or child-directed offenses—stalking, bodily harm, and disfigurement with permanent facial injuries and related aggravating circumstances). In this case, extensive scientific literature exists, particularly regarding similar measures in the United States, where registries established under Megan’s Laws are reserved for sex offenders.

As analyzed in an article co-authored with Roberto Cornelli and Lorenzo Natali (link to article), these measures are closely tied to the emotional reactions triggered by sexual violence. They serve a symbolic purpose and are largely ineffective: they do not appear to reduce sexual offenses but do significantly impair the social reintegration of offenders by restricting access to housing, employment, and community support.

More broadly, the registries proposed in the Italian bill, like their American counterparts, send a message of societal intolerance toward individuals who commit acts of violence against women—while simultaneously reinforcing the notion (at odds with the bill’s other premises) that such individuals are perpetually dangerous and incapable of change. These measures further perpetuate the belief that the state cannot guarantee public safety, implicitly assigning the burden of surveillance and self-protection to private citizens.

Taken together, the two central components of the bill reveal a profound sense of collective disorientation in the face of male violence against women. The legislative response appears to be an expressive and performative one, oscillating between preventive medical punishment and public shaming—offering little room for the layered, nuanced approaches that this deeply sensitive area of intervention requires.

In conclusion, it is imperative to advocate for prevention strategies that recognize the psychological, social, and cultural roots of male violence against women. Interventions must continue to be developed collaboratively, grounded in fieldwork and supported by scientific research. At the same time, it is crucial to remain vigilant and critical of so-called “protective” measures for women that, in reality, serve as symbolic, stigmatizing, and anti-democratic responses to a problem that demands complexity, care, and systemic vision.